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TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann. § 77-12-4 (1982) states:
Bench warrant or summons for defendant not in
custody. When an indictment is found against a
defendant not in custody, a bench warrant or summons
shall be issued against him as determined by the
court.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-29 (1982) states:
Rights of parolee or probationer—Record of
proceedings. With respect to any hearing pursuant
to this act, the parolee or probationer shall have
the following rights:
(a) Reasonable notice in writing of the
nature and content of the allegations to be made,
including notice that its purpose is to determine
whether there is probable cause to believe that he
has committed a violation that may lead to a
revocation of parole or probation.
(b) Be permitted to advise with any persons
whose assistance he reasonably desires, prior to the
hearing.
(c) To confront and examine any persons who
have made allegations against him, unless the
hearing officer determines that such confrontation
would present a substantial present or subsequent
danger of harm to such person or persons.
(d) May admit, deny or explain the violation
alleged and may present proof, including affidavits
and other evidence, in support of his contentions.
A record of the proceedings shall be made and
preserved.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-22 (1982) states:
Fugitives from this state—Issuance of governor's
warrant. Whenever the governor of this state shall
demand a person charged with a crime or with
escaping from confinement or breaking the terms of
his bail, probation, or parole in this state from
the executive authority of any other state or from
the chief justice or an associate justice of the
superior court of the District of Columbia

iii

authorized to receive such demand under the laws of
the United States, he shall issue a warrant under
the seal of this state to some agent, commanding him
to receive the person so charged if delivered to him
and convey him to the proper officer of the county
in this state in which the offense was committed.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-23 (1982) states in pertinent part:
Fugitives from this state—Applications for
requisition for return.
(2) When the return to this state is
required of a person who has been convicted of a
crime in this state and has escaped from confinement
or broken the terms of his bail, probation or parole
the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the
offense was committed, the parole board, or the
warden of the institution or sheriff of the county
from which escape was made shall present to the
governor a written application for a requisition for
the return of such person, in which application
shall be stated the name of the person, the crime of
which he was convicted, the circumstances of his
escape from confinement, or of the breach of the
terms of his bail, probation or parole, the state in
which he is believed to be, including the location
of the person therein at the time application is
made.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(3) (Interim Supp. 1984)
See Addendum B.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8) (Interim Supp. 1984)
See Addendum B.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8)(b) (Supp. 1989)
See Addendum A.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a) (Interim Supp. 1984)
See Addendum B.

iv

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11)(b) (Interim Supp. 1984)
See Addendum B.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (Interim Supp. 1984)
See Addendum B.
Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States provides in
pertinent part:
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

:

JOSEPH FINANO MOYA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 890608-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a
first degree or capital felony.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did Appellant Moya's probation terminate, by operation

of law, eighteen months after he was sentenced?
2.

Did the jurisdiction of the sentencing court terminate

when the State failed to continue Appellant's probation pursuant to
statute?
3.

Did the court indefinitely suspend Appellant Moya's

sentence and consequently lose its jurisdiction?
4.
situation?

Does the 1984 tolling provision apply to Mr. Moya's

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On August 10, 1984, Appellant Joseph Finano Moya entered a
guilty plea to the charge of Burglary, a third degree felony.
Record (hereinafter referred to as "R") at 13-14.
sentenced Appellant Moya on September 13, 1984.

See

The court
See R. 84;

Transcript of September 13, 1984 Sentencing Proceedings (hereinafter
referred to as "TA") at 1.
Shortly thereafter on October 3, 1984, the court released
Mr. Moya to the State of New Mexico where he faced charges
unconnected to the Utah burglary charge. (R. 19);(TA. 4 ) . On or
about April 17, 1985, the State of Utah discovered that the New
Mexico charges would not be continued. (R. 23).
On October 21, 1988, the State of Utah filed an "Affidavit
in Support of Order to Show Cause" which sought to revoke Appellant
Moya's probation. (R. 41). At Appellant's Order to Show Cause
hearing on November 10, 1988, the court revoked Mr. Moya's probation
and reinstated a prison term previously suspended. Transcript of
Sentencing Proceedings, dated November 10, 1988 (hereinafter
referred to as "TB") at 8; (R. 44). On February 17, 1989 and
September 6, 1989, the parties again appeared before the court on a
Motion for Rehearing. Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings, dated
February 17, 1989 and September 6, 1989 (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "TC") at 1.

The court upheld its previous ruling.

(TC. 19-20).
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
During the September 13, 1984 sentencing proceeding before
the Honorable Scott Daniels, Appellant's counsel informed the court
of outstanding warrants and charges filed against Appellant by
New Mexico authorities.

See R. 84; (TA. 4-8). New Mexico sought to

extradite Appellant for charges unconnected to the Utah burglary
charge. (TA. 5).
Recognizing that the New Mexico charges were merely
allegations and not proven convictions, Judge Daniels refused to
consider them in sentencing Appellant to an indeterminative term of
"not more than five years" in the Utah State Prison.

(R. 84);

(TA. 13). The court immediately suspended the sentence "upon
probation and the following conditions to be imposed[:]

That the

defendant [Mr. Moya] spend six months in the Salt Lake County
Jail[;] . . . pay full restitution[;] and . . . complete upon his
release from jail an alcohol rehabilitation program to be set up by
the Department of Adult Probation & Parole [AP&P]." (TA. 13). The
court suspended these sentences too, holding that "those conditions
[are] also to be stayed, assuming [Appellant] is extradited also,
until he is returned from New Mexico" (TA. 13).
Following the sentencing proceeding, the court recorded
Appellant's sentence in a "Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) to Utah
State Prison" form (R. 17-18).

The court, however, omitted any

reference to the New Mexico extradition proceedings.
(TA. 13) with (R. 17-18) .

- 3 -

Compare

On September 17, 1984, the court authorized Mr. Moya's
extradition to New Mexico (R. 19). On October 3, 1984, Mr. Moya
"was released from the Salt Lake County Jail . . . to the custody of
New Mexico authorities" (R. 23). However, before Adult Probation &
Parole (AP&P) became aware of the extradition, it filed an incident
report, dated January 9, 1985, which recommended a "No Bail Bench
Warrant" and an "Order to Show Cause hearing." (R. 20, 23). The
report alleged that Mr. Moya had not contacted AP&P following his
release from jail and implied that he had not paid his court-ordered
restitution. (R. 20). Based upon these allegations the court
authorized the Bench Warrant, dated Jaunuary 14, 1985, (R. 22),
though no Order to Show Cause hearing was set nor did the State or
AP&P file the affidavit required by statute (R. 20-21).
On April 17, 1985, AP&P filed a second incident report
which recommended that the interstate "NCIC,1 No bail warrant of
January 14, 1985, be recalled, and that a [intrastate] 'Domestic7
warrant, with [a] bail of $25,000 be issued" (R. 23). AP&P, now
aware of Appellant's whereabouts, reported that since Mr. Moya's
October 3, 1984 release, "[h]e has remained in [the custody of
New Mexico authorities], and it appears now that the charges in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, will not be continued, due to prosecutorial
problems" (R. 23). AP&P went on to state:

1

"This agency [AP&P] does

Appellant believes that "NCIC," while not expressly
defined by AP&P, stands for the "National Crime Information Center,"
a national system capable of notifying other states of outstanding
bench warrants issued in Utah. In contrast, a "Domestic" warrant is
only used intrastate. See infra Point IVB.

- 4

not feel that it would be advisable to extradite defendant back to
Utah, but we would request that a 'Domestic' warrant be issued to
arrest defendant in the event he decides to return to Utah"
(R. 23). The court approved AP&P's recommendation and recalled the
interstate bench warrant (R. 24, 28). In its place, the court
issued the more local, "Domestic" bench warrant on May 1, 1985
(R. 29).
Following his release from custody, Appellant, while still
in New Mexico, committed the offense of forgery on or about
August 8, 1985 (R. 49). On September 23, 1986, Appellant entered a
guilty plea on the forgery charge, but the New Mexico court
suspended his sentence in favor of probation (R. 49-51).

No further

incidents took place and Appellant apparently returned to Utah some
time in early to mid-1988 (TC. 15).
On October 21, 1988, AP&P, cognizant of Mr. Moya's return
to Utah, submitted for the first time an "Affidavit in Support of
Order to Show Cause" which sought to revoke Appellant's probation
(R. 41-42).

The affidavit alleged, inter alia, that Appellant Moya

had not reported to AP&P "for forty (40) months, those being April
1985, through August 1988, . . . " that Appellant had not made any
court-ordered payments, and that he had not "execute[d] a Probation
Agreement." (R. 41-42, Jl, 2, 3). The court continued the Order to
Show Cause hearing until October 25, 1988, giving AP&P time to check
on Appellant's status in New Mexico (R. 40).
On October 25, 1988, AP&P filed an "Amended Affidavit in
Support of Order to Show Cause" after discovering that Appellant was

- 5
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convicted in New Mexico. (R. 32, 33, f4). AP&P also alleged a
July 2, 1988 Utah Burglary charge (R. 33, f5). The court continued
the hearing again until November 10, 1988, this time giving
Appellant's counsel time to review the newly received information
(R. 43).
At the November 10, 1988 Order to Show Cause hearing, the
court, relying solely on hearsay statements and without reviewing
the actual transcript of the September 13, 1984 sentencing
proceeding, determined that Mr. Moya had violated his probation.
(TB. 8);(R. 44). The court revoked Appellant's probation and
reinstated his zero-to-five-year prison term.

Appellant filed a

Motion for Rehearing. (TB. 8);(R. 55).
After various delays and the eventual production of the
September 13, 1984 sentencing transcript, Appellant and the State
again appeared before Judge Daniels' court on the Motion for
Rehearing. (TC. 6). Judge Daniels reviewed the transcript, (R. 84);
(TC. 19), compared it with the "Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) to
Utah State Prison" form, (R. 17-18), and then ruled as follows:
the conditions of [Mr. Moya's] probation were to be
tolled until he came back to Utah and when he did,
it seems to me [the Court] he violated his
probation. And I don't think that you can just make
yourself scarce for two or three or five years and
then have your probation expire . . . I think
the . . . law . . . would indicate that once a bench
warrant is issued, the conditions of probation are
stayed until such time as the defendant is
arrested. So I think he was still on probation.
(TC. 19-20).

The court denied Appellant's Motion, relying

improperly on the State's argument that a 1989 tolling provision
applied to Appellant's 1984 sentencing proceeding. (TC. 17-20).
- 6 -

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
On September 13, 1984, a court sentenced Appellant Joseph
Finano Moya to an indeterminate prison term of zero to five years
which was immediately suspended and replaced by an eighteen-month
period of probation.

The court's jurisdiction over Mr. Moya's

probation then terminated, by operation of law, eighteen months
later on March 13, 1986.
The State's failure to follow the statutory guidelines for
a continuance, at even one time during Appellant's entire
probationary period, also terminated the court's jurisdiction.
Furthermore, when the State did act, it should not have recommended
the recall of an interstate bench warrant issued against Appellant.
The court, upon granting the State's request and in its place
issuing a local "Domestic" warrant, indefinitely suspended
Mr. Moya's sentence since he was then permitted to live freely in
any jurisdiction outside of Utah for the rest of his life.
The tolling provision, in effect at the time of Mr. Moya's
sentencing, was nullified by the recent Utah Supreme Court decision
of State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988).

Mr. Moya's presence in

New Mexico was also implicitly authorized by the State of Utah.
The court committed reversible error when it improperly
retained its jurisdiction over Mr. Moya's probation more than four
years after the date of sentencing.

Accordingly, the revocation of

Mr. Moya's probation and the reinstatement of the prison term were
also improper.

- 7
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
STATE V, GREEN'S INTERPRETATION OF THE APPLICABLE
STATUTE TERMINATED APPELLANT'S PROBATION AFTER
EIGHTEEN MONTHS,
"[T]he power to revoke probation must be exercised within
legislatively established limits."
464 (Utah 1988).

State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462,

The statutory authority here, as in Green, is Utah

Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a) (Interim Supp. 1984) which reads:
Upon completion without violation of 18 months
probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or
six months in class B misdemeanor cases, the
offender shall be terminated from sentence and the
supervision of the Division of Corrections, unless
the person is earlier terminated by the court.
Id.

Despite the fact that defendant Terry Green had indeed violated

his probation in contravention of the first clause of the statute,
the Utah Supreme Court held that defendant Green7s probation "shall
be terminated" eighteen months after the date of his sentencing.
Green, 757 P.2d at 464.

In short, regardless of what the defendant

may have done during his period of probation, after eighteen months
the jurisdiction of the sentencing court ended.

Id.

In Green, defendant Green "pleaded guilty on February 7,
1984, to a charge of issuing bad checks . . . ."
462.

Green, 757 P.2d

On May 29, 1984, the trial court sentenced Green2 "to an

indeterminate term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison,"

2

The Green Court applied Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)
(Interim Supp. 1984) to defendant Green's May 29, 1984 sentence.
The same statute would therefore apply to Appellant Moya's
September 13, 1984 sentence. (R. 84).
- 8

fined him fifteen hundred dollars, and ordered him to pay
restitution.

Id.

"The court suspended the prison term and the fine

and placed defendant on probation.

Defendant agreed as one

condition of probation that he would not violate federal, state, or
local rules."

Id.

Sometime during the months of April, May, and June of 1985,
Green committed three statutory offenses for which he was ultimately
convicted.

Id.

Shortly thereafter, on February 18, 1986, an Adult

Probation & Parole (AP&P) officer informed the trial court of
Green's involvement in the three offenses.

Id.

There is no

indication that AP&P filed an affidavit in support of its initial
report.

However, after the court convicted Green on June 26, 1986,

"AP&P [then] filed an affidavit of probation violation with the
court on August 5, 1986."

Green. 757 P.2d 462.

Following various

appeals and delays the trial court, on March 31, 1987, ordered Green
"to serve the term of zero to five years originally imposed upon him
for the bad check conviction."

Id. at 463.

Defendant Green

appealed the trial court's revocation of his probation.
The State in Green argued that the probation period is
"tolled" whenever a defendant commits a violation within the
eighteen-month period.

The trial court agreed but the Utah Supreme

Court reversed, holding:
The statute requires that the offender "shall" be
terminated from sentence if eighteen months'
probation is completed without violation. This
strong mandate is not consistent with the State's
position that the eighteen month period is "tolled"
when any violation occurs within the period and that
there is no time limit for initiating a revocation
action.
- 9

The Stated interpretation of the statute would
create absurd results. Defendants would be left in
a perpetual state of limbo; although their probation
would appear to have been terminated, usually by
entry of an order to that effect, defendants would
actually be subject to a continued term of fictional
supervision. This indefinite probationary term
could theoretically be revoked many years after the
original imposition and suspension of sentence.
Decades could pass and then, based upon the
discovery of a probation violation which had
occurred during the statutory period, a court could
revoke a term of probation thought to have been
terminated long ago. This construction would
obviate the certainty and regularity created by the
statute and ignore the plain meaning of the word
"terminate."
Green, 757 P.2d at 464.
The State's argument in the case at bar is virtually
identical to the State's argument in Green.

The exception is that

the State here, unlike the State in Green, mistakenly relied3 on a
1989 statute whose "tolling" provision was ineffective at the time
of Appellant's sentencing. (TC. 17-18); Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-1(8)(b) (Supp. 1989); see Addendum A.

The 1989 statute

tolls the probation period "upon the filing of a violation report
with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of
probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant
by the court."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8)(b) (Supp. 1989).

The court based its decision to revoke Appellant Moya's
probation on this inapplicable provision, believing incorrectly that
"the letter of the law itself would indicate that once a bench

3

The State misstated the nature and extent of the
amendments made by the 1989 legislature. (TC. 18). A great deal
more than the eighteen-month probation period was changed. See
Addendum A.
- 10 -

warrant is issued, the conditions of probation are stayed until such
time as the defendant [Mr. Moya] is arrested.

So I [the court]

think he was still on probation" (TC. 19-20) (emphasis added).
Appellant Moya admits that if the 1989 provision was in effect when
the court sentenced him on September 13, 1984, the State's tolling
argument could apply.

However, since the 1989 provision was not

then in place, the State in Appellant Moya's case is left with the
same untenable argument as the State in Green.

If a probationer

violates a condition of probation, his probation may not be revoked
unless it is done pursuant to statute and within the eighteen-month
automatic termination period.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (Interim

Supp. 1984); State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988); State v.
Dennev, 776 P.2d 91 (Utah App. 1989).
A probation violation, by itself, is not enough to extend
the court's jurisdiction unless the court first sets an Order to
Show Cause hearing and then finds that the defendant had in fact
violated his probation.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (Interim Supp.

1984); Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-29 (1982).4

4

As noted by the Green

Since the State did not initiate revocation proceedings
until after Appellant Moya's eighteen-month period of probation, it
obviously did not adhere to all the constitutionally required
procedures for probation revocation. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-29
(1982); cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (the minimum
requirements of due process in revoking parole include (a) written
notice of the claimed parole violations, (b) disclosure of the
evidence against him, (c) an opportunity to be heard in person and
to present witnesses and documentary evidence, (d) the right to
cross-examine adverse witnesses, (e) a neutral hearing body, and
(f) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied
on and the reasons for revoking probation); Gaqnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778 (1973) (recognizing that a probationer possesses liberty
interests similar to those of a parolee and is entitled to the
minimum due process requirements of Morrissey).
- 11 -

Court, "all but technical [probation] violations can be punished on
their own merits, and the defendant's past record can be considered
at that time."

Green, 757 P.2d at 465.

The State did not follow the statutory requirements and the
court should not have followed the State's tolling argument. (TC.
17-20).

The court committed reversible error by reinstating

Mr. Moya's prison sentence after Mr. Moya's probation had already
been terminated, by operation of law, on March 13, 1986, eighteen
months after his September 13, 1984 sentence.

Green, 757 P.2d 462;

Penney. 116 P.2d 91.

POINT II
THE STATE SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED APPELLANT'S
PROBATION PURSUANT TO STATUTE.
Assuming, arguendo, that the automatic termination clause
does not apply, the relevant provisions of the 1984 statute, Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (Interim Supp. 1984), would still preclude
the court's revocation of Appellant's probation.

The statutory

provisions state:
(12)(a) Probation may not be revoked except
upon a hearing in court and a finding that the
conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging
with particularity facts asserted to constitute
violation of the conditions of probation, the court
which authorized probation shall determine whether
the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe
that revocation or modification of probation may be
justified. If the court determines that there is
probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the
defendant a copy of the affidavit and an order to
show cause why his probation should not be revoked
or modified.
- 12 -

(c) The order to show cause shall specify a
time and place for the hearing, which shall be
within seven days of the service upon the defendant
unless he shows good cause for a continuance, and
shall inform the defendant of the right to be
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have
counsel appointed for him if he is indigent. The
order shall also inform the defendant of the right
to present evidence as provided in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit
or deny the allegations of the affidavit. If the
defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit,
the prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on
the allegations, which need not be evidence
admissible in a trial. The persons who have given
adverse information on which the allegations are
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to
questioning by the defendant unless the court for
good cause otherwise orders. The defendant may call
witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and
present evidence.
(e) After hearing, the court shall make
findings of fact. Upon determining that the
defendant violated the conditions of probation, the
court may order the probation revoked, modified, or
continued. If probation is revoked, the defendant
shall be sentenced or the sentence previously
imposed shall be executed.
Id.; see Addendum B.
The trial court in Green, as in the case at bar, "could
have continued its jurisdiction over [the] defendant for another
eighteen-month term."

Id. at 465.

Defendant Green, like Appellant

Moya, "had not yet completed paying all of the restitution that he
was ordered to pay," a violation subjecting his probation to
revocation, modification, or a continuance.5

5

Id.; (R. 20); Utah

Although the Green court correctly noted that the 1984
statute does not specifically empower the trial court to continue
its jurisdiction over defendant Green for another eighteen-month
(continued)
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Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8), (12)(e) (Interim Supp. 1984).
The trial court below, much like the trial court in Green,
was unable to revoke, modify, or continue Appellant Moya,s case
because no Order to Show Cause hearing was set, nor did the State
file an affidavit pursuant to statute (R. 20); Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-1(12) (Interim Supp. 1984).

Instead AP&P, apparently

unaware of Appellants extradition to New Mexico, filed an incident
report, dated January 9, 1985,6 and requested a "No-Bail Bench
Warrant."

(R. 20). The court issued the NCIC warrant on

January 14, 1985.

(R. 21, 27); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-12-4

(1982).
AP&P's then filed a second incident report, dated April 17,
1985, which stated in pertinent part:
Defendant was released from the Salt Lake County
Jail on October 3, 1984, to the custody of
New Mexico authorities. He has remained in their
custody, in Rio Arriba County, and it appears now
that the charges in Albuquerque, New Mexico, will
not be continued, due to prosecutorial problems.

(footnote 5 continued)
term, Green. 757 P.2d at 465 n.4, the 1984 statute did nevertheless
empower the court to "order the probation . . . continued [for an
unstated term]." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(e) (Interim Supp.
1984).
6

In its January 9, 1985 incident report AP&P recommended
a NCIC "No Bail Bench Warrant" and an "Order to Show Cause Hearing"
(R. 20). Although the court issued the bench warrant on January 14,
1985, (R. 21-22), again an act inappropriate under Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-1(12) (Interim Supp. 1984), the court did not set the Order
to Show Cause hearing until November 10, 1988, many years after
Appellant's eighteen-month period of probation had expired (R. 40).
AP&P should have followed through on its recommendation rather than
being content with only the court-ordered bench warrant.
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This agency (AP&P) does not feel
advisable to extradite defendant
we would request that a domestic
to arrest defendant in the event
return to Utah.
(R. 23); see Addendum C.
set.

that it would be
back to Utah, but
warrant be issued
he decides to

Again, no Order to Show Cause hearing was

See infra Point IVB (discussion on implicit authority by the

State).
AP&P did not adhere to the statutory requirements and
wrongly filed two incident reports instead of an affidavit alleging
"with particularity" various probation violations (e.g. nonpayment
of restitution, failure to complete the alcohol treatment program).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(b) (Interim Supp. 1984).7

If the State

had properly initiated continuation proceedings, the court could
have then determined whether AP&P's affidavit established "probable
cause to believe that revocation or modification of probation may be
justified."

Id.8

After serving Appellant with a copy of the

affidavit and an order to show cause,9 he could have then explained
why his probation should not be revoked or modified.

Id.

Following

the hearing, "the court may [have ordered] the probation revoked,

7

AP&P has no excuse for not formally and properly filing
an affidavit pursuant to statute. Even though AP&P filed two
incident reports which did not conform to statute, it later
displayed its ability to satisfy the requisite standards when it
filed the "Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause." (R. 41);
see Addendum D.
8

The trial court in Green, unlike the trial court in the
instant action, issued "[a] certificate of probable cause" upon
revoking defendant Green's probation. Green, 757 P.2d at 463. No
such certificate was ever issued to Appellant Moya.
9

Appellant Moya also never received the affidavit nor the
notice of the hearing until November 10, 1988. (R. 40, 41).
- 15 -

modified, or continued."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(e) (Interim

Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
In contrast, the State's first action done pursuant to
statute occurred October 21, 1988 when AP&P filed an "Affidavit in
Support of Order to Show Cause" (R. 41-42); Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-1(12)(b).

An Order to Show Cause hearing was then

scheduled, (R. 40), and eventually held to determine whether
Mr. Moya violated his probation and whether the court should revoke
his probation (TB. 1); (TC. 1).
Since the court initially sentenced Mr. Moya on
September 13, 1984 and the State failed to timely and properly
continue Appellant's period of probation, the State's October 21,
1988 affidavit was one year, seven months and eight days too late.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a) (Interim Supp. 1984).

Appellant

Moya's probation had terminated, by operation of law, on March 13,
1986.
Everything done by AP&P or the court within the
eighteen-month period of probation—AP&P's filing of the January 9,
1985 incident report; the court-ordered January 14, 1985 NCIC bench
warrant; AP&P's filing of the April 17, 1985 incident report; and
the court-ordered May 1, 1985 "Domestic" bench warrant—were all
wholly inadequate for a continuance under the express mandate of the
1984 statute.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (Interim Supp. 1984).

The court therefore erred in retaining its jurisdiction over
Mr. Moya, in revoking his probation, and in reinstating the
indeterminate prison term (TC. 19-20).
not been continued.
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The court's jurisdiction had

POINT III
THE COURT LOST ITS JURISDICTION OVER APPELLANT AFTER
HIS SENTENCE WAS INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED.
Assuming, arguendo, that the automatic termination clause
and the continuance arguments do not apply, the court's indefinite
suspension of Appellant's sentence voided the validity of the
subsequent revocation proceedings.

The court lost its jurisdiction

over Mr. Moya by indefinitely suspending his sentence.
On April 17, 1985, seven months into Appellant's probation,
AP&P reported that Mr. Moya "has remained in [the custody of
New Mexico authorities] in Rio Arriba County, and it appears now
that the charges in Albuquerque, New Mexico, will not be continued,
due to prosecutorial problems" (R. 23). Despite Appellant Moya's
impending release, AP&P did "not feel that it would be adviseable to
extradite defendant [Mr. Moya] back to Utah, but we [AP&P] would
request that a 'Domestic' warrant be issued to arrest defendant in
the event he decides to return to Utah" (R. 23); see Addendum C.
AP&P did absolutely nothing to extradite Appellant. See,
infra. Point IV (discussion on implied authority by the State).
Instead, AP&P recommended that the court recall the NCIC 10 bench
warrant in exchange for the local "Domestic" warrant (R. 23). When
the court issued the May 1, 1985 Domestic warrant, it indefinitely
suspended Appellant's sentence (R. 29).
Once New Mexico released Appellant, Mr. Moya could live in

10

See supra note 1.
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any jurisdiction other than Utah for the rest of his life. His
freedom would only be compromised "in the event he decide[d] to
return to Utah" (R. 23). Obviously, Mr. Moya may have never
returned to Utah.

Such indefinite sentences have been prohibited

since the turn of the century:
[The Utah Supreme Court knows] of no rule or
principle of law whereby a court can indefinitely
suspend sentence, keep the defendant in a state of
suspense and uncertainty, and long after he has been
discharged from custody, have him rearrested, and
impose a sentence of either fine or imprisonment on
him.
In re Flint, 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531 (1903) reprinted in Green, 757
P.2d at 464. The Utah court left Appellant Moya in an impermissible
state of uncertainty by condoning his freedom while still seeking
his arrest only when, and if, many years after he had been
discharged from custody "he decide[d] to return to Utah." (R. 23).
Therefore, the trial court could not have properly revoked
Appellant's probation because it no longer had jurisdiction over his
case. £f. In re Flint. 71 P. at 532 ("When the court suspended
judgment indefinitely, and ordered the defendant discharged from
custody, it no longer had jurisdiction over him, and all subsequent
proceedings . . . were unauthorized by law, and are therefore void").

POINT IV
THE 1984 TOLLING PROVISION DOES NOT APPLY.
Assuming further that the above arguments do not apply, the
tolling provision of the 1984 statute would not apply to Appellant
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Moya's situation.

Appellants situation should also be governed by

the decision of State v Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988).

A.

STATE V. GREEN RENDERS IMPRACTICABLE THE 1984
TOLLING PROVISION.

The principle underlying Green is that, in 1984, the acts
or inactions of the probationer could not toll the eighteen-month
period of probation. 757 P.2d 462; Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)
(Interim Supp. 1984).

Even though defendant Green had in fact

violated the terms of his probation in April, May and June of 1985,
eleven to thirteen months after his sentencing, the Green Court
recognized that the eighteen-month probation period was not tolled
because

fl

[t]he State's interpretation of the statute would create

absurd results."

Green, 757 P.2d at 464. Allowing the State "to

revoke probation after the expiration of the eighteen-month period
upon discovery that a [probation] violation occurred during that
period . . . [would subject defendants] to a continued term of
fictional supervision."

Green, 757 P.2d at 463, 464.

Green's interpretation of section (10)(a), the paragraph
automatically terminating the court's jurisdiction and the
accompanying period of probation after eighteen months, eviscerated
the tolling provision in effect at the time of Appellant Moya's
sentencing.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11)(b) (Interim Supp. 1984).

The 1984 tolling provision reads:
(11)(b) Whenever any probationer, without authority
from the Division of Corrections, absents himself
from the state, or avoids or evades probation
supervision, the period of absence, avoidance, or
evasion tolls the probation period.
- 19 -

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11)(b) (Interim Supp. 1984); see
Addendum B.

The tolling language of section (11)(b) should be

construed in conjunction with the automatic termination clause of
section (10)(a).

See Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679

P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984) ("Separate parts of an act should not be
construed in isolation from the rest of the act").
Just as the court in Green refused to recognize the
indefinite time limitations of section (10)(a), Appellant Moya now
requests this Court to similarly preclude the application of the
indefinite tolling provision of section (11)(b).

Conceivably, both

sections would allow the State to initiate a revocation proceeding
decades after the actual occurrence of the probation violation.
Green Court found this result absurd.

The

757 P.2d at 464.

The 1989 Utah Legislature also recognized this incongruity
and amended the 1984 tolling provision in conformance with Green.
The relevant 1989 provision now reads:
(8)(b) The running of the probation period is
tolled upon the filing of a violation report with
the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an
order to show cause or warrant by the court.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8)(b) (Supp. 1989); see Addendum A.

The

present tolling provision thus properly focuses on the actions of
the State instead of on the actions or inactions of the
probationer.

However, since the 1989 provision was not in place at

the time of Appellant Moya's 1984 sentencing, the only applicable
tolling provision was section (11)(b), a soon-to-be-cured provision
which left all probationers in a "perpetual state of limbo." Green,
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757 P.2d at 464. Hence, section (11)(b) should also be controlled
by section 10(a), the clause prohibiting indefinite time periods for
initiating revocation proceedings. Under either section, the trial
court's jurisdiction over Appellant Moya ended on March 13, 1986.
B.

THE STATE IMPLICITLY AUTHORIZED AND KNEW ABOUT
APPELLANT'S WHEREABOUTS OUTSIDE THE STATE OF
UTAH.

Not only is section (11)(b) inapplicable when construed
with the rest of the act, the section by itself appears inapposite
to Mr. Moya's situation.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11)(b) (Interim

Supp. 1984) states in pertinent part, the probation period is tolled
"[w]henever any probationer, without authority from the Division of
Corrections, absents himself from the State, or avoids or evades
probation supervision . . . ."

Id. (emphasis added).

On September 17, 1984, four days after the court had sentenced
Appellant Moya, it ordered Appellant's extradition to New Mexico
through an "Order of Release" (R. 19). On October 3, 1984, the Salt
Lake County Jail released Mr. Moya into the custody of the
New Mexico extradition authorities (R. 23). Appellant Moya's stay
in New Mexico was therefore not an unlawful situation where he
escaped confinement and fled to another jurisdiction.

Rather, the

State of Utah had expressly released Mr. Moya into New Mexico and
then did nothing to secure his return.
AP&P's April 17, 1985 incident report reflected its
knowledge of Mr. Moya's whereabouts and his impending release from
New Mexico. (R. 23). Nevertheless Utah did not ever, at that date
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nor at any other time during Appellant's entire eighteen month
period of probation, attempt to extradite Appellant back to Utah.
Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-23 (Interim Supp. 1984) (procedures for
extradition); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(3)(Interim Supp. 1984) ("the
Division of Corrections is not required to supervise the probation
. . . of any person convicted of a class B or C misdemeanor. . ."
which, by negative implication, requires State supervision of any
person, such as Appellant Moya, convicted of a felony).
In Green, the Utah Supreme Court expressed little sympathy
for the State's lack of knowledge and its inability to detect
probation violations within the statutory time period. State v.
Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988)(even though the State in Green did
not know about defendant Green's probation violation until
February 18, 1986, twenty-one months after his sentencing, that fact
still would not justify tolling his probation).

In marked

difference the State in Appellant Moya's case knew that Mr. Moya had
allegedly violated his probation as early as four and seven months
after his sentencing. (R. 20, 23). Yet the State decided not to
question him about his lack of compliance.
The State of Utah actually furthered Appellant's freedom by
downgrading the January 14, 1985 bench warrant in favor of the
May 1, 1985 "Domestic" warrant. (TC. 14); (R. 23-30); cf- Utah Code
Ann. § 77-12-4 (1982) (court's discretion in determining what type
of warrant to issue); Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-22 (1982) ("Whenever
the governor of this state shall demand a person charged
with . . . breaking the terms of his . . . probation . . . in this
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state . . .

f

he shall issue a warrant under the seal of this state

to some agent [of the executive authority of any other state],
commanding him to receive the person so charged . . . and convey him
to . . . this state . . . . " ) ; see supra Point III.

Consequently,

foreign jurisdictions no longer knew about Appellant's situation in
Utah.

This fact is plainly evident by New Mexico's September 23,

1986 "Judgment and Order Suspending Sentence." (R. 49-51).

New

Mexico made no mention of Appellant's criminal record in Utah. Had
the NCIC warrant not been recalled, New Mexico authorities would not
have released Appellant or, alternatively, would have placed him on
probation in New Mexico only after informing the State of Utah.
Utah thus decided to lose all track of Appellant until "he decide[d]
to return to Utah" (R. 23).
In short, because AP&P did "not feel that it would be
adviseable to extradite defendant [Mr. Moya] back to Utah," the
State implicitly authorized his presence in New Mexico. (R. 23). The
tolling provision of the 1984 statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-1(11)(b) (Interim Supp. 1984), does not apply.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant Moya respectfully requests this Court to reverse
the lower court's decision and remand this case for the entry of an
order terminating Utah's custody over Appellant.
I[

Respectfully submitted this

day pf April, 1990.
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H. B. No. 314
Passed 2-22-89, Approved 3-14-89
Effective 4-24-89
Uws of Utah 1989, Chapter 226

Probation Amendments 1989
By R. Lee Ellertson
An Act relating to criminal procedure; amen-

HB314

UTAH LEGISLATIVE REPORT 1989

ding the length of probation and supervision.

Oxk#Co

or C misdemeanors or infractions, or to conduct
presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions.' However, the department
may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanTHIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH
ants in accordance with department standards.
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:
(4) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the
court may, with the concurrence of the defendant,
AMENDS:
continue the date for the imposition of sentence for
77-18-1, as last amended by Chapter 114, Laws
a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtof Utah 1987
aining a presentence investigation report from the
Be It toacted by the Legislature of the state of UUb: Department of Correctidns or information from
other sources about the defendant. The presentence
Section 1: Section Amended.
investigation report shall include a specific statement
Section 77-18-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommas last amended by Chapter 114, Laws of Utah
endation from the Department of Corrections reg1987,' is amended to read:
arding the payment of restitution by the defendant.
The contents of the report are confidential and not
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence - Probation available except for purposes of sentencing as proSupervision - Presentence investigation •
vided by rule of the Judicial Council .and for use by
Standards - Confidential - Terms the Department of Corrections.
Termination - Restitution - Revocation
(b) Ar the time of sentence, the court shair hear
Hearings.
(1) (a) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conv- any testimony or informatidn the defendant or the
prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning
ictioa pf. any crime or offense, the court may
the appropriate sentence. This testimony or inforsuspend the imposition or execution of sentence and
place the defendant on probation. [Supervised] The mation shall be presented in open court on record
and in the presence of the defendant.
coujttmay placcTihc defendant:
(5) While on probation, and as a condition of
(i) on probation [by) under the supervision of the
(department may not be imposed by the court] probation,' the defendant may be required to
Department of Corrections except in cases of class C perform any or all of the following:
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed
misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local govern- at the time of being placed on probation;
(b) pay amounts required under Chapter 32a,
ment or with a private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of Title 77, Defense Costs;
(c) provide for the support of others for whqse
the sentencing court. [The jurisdiction of all prob
ationers referred to the Department of Corrections support he is legally liable;
(d) participate in available treatment programs;
is vested in the court having jurisdiction! custody is
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to
with the Department of Corrections,]
exceed one year;
(b) The legaf custody of all probationers [not
( 0 icrve a term of home confinement;
referred to) under the supervision of the department
(g) participate in community service restitution
is with the Department of Corrections. The legal
programs;
custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of
(h) pay, for the costs of investigation, probation,
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the
court [having jurisdiction of the defendant]. The and treatment services; [and]
(i) make restitution or reparation to ihe victim or
court ha* continuing jurisdiction over all probatiovictims in accordance with Subsections 76-3-201
ners.
(2) (a) The Department of Corrections shall esta- (3)and(4)fc];and
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the
blish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the depart- court considers appropriate.
(6) The Department of Corrections is responsible,
ment. These standards shall be based on the type of
upon order of the court, for the collection of fines
offense, the demand for services, the availability of
agency resource*,, the public safety, and other crit- and restitution during the probation period in cases
[where] for which the court orders supervised proeria established, by the Department of Corrections to
bation by the department. The prosecutor shall
determine what level of services shall.be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation stan- provide notice of the restitution order to the clerk of
the court. The clerk shall place the order on the civil
dards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and
Board of Pardons on an annual basis for review and docket and shall provide notice of the order to the
parties. The order is considered a legal judgment
comment pripf to. adoption, by the Department of
[under which the victim may seek civil remedy]
Corrections.'
enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Proce(c) The Judicial Council and department shall
dure.
establish procedures to implement the supervision
(7) (a) [Upon] Probation may be terminated at
and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall I any time at the discretion of the court or upon
annually consider modifications to the standards completion without violation of [18 months'] 36
based upon criteria in Subsection (2) (a) and other months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor
cases, or [sm\ \2 months in cases of class B [miscriteria as they consider appropriate.
demeanor easest the probation period shall be ter(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall
annually prepare an impact report and submit it to minated» unless earlier terminated by the court] or C
misdemeanors or infractions. If the defendant, upon
the appropriate legislative appropriations committee.
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the expiration or termination of the probation period,
Department of Corrections is not' required to supe- has outstanding- fines or restitution owing, the court
I mav retain Jurisdiction of the case and continue the
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dant on bench probation for the limited purpose of probation should not be revoked, modified, or extenforcing the payment "of fines and restitution. ended.
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time
Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon
its own motion, the court may require the defendant 1 and place for the hearing, and shall be served upon
to show cause why his failure to pay should not be the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing.
treated as contempt of court or why the suspended The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. The order to show cause shall inform the
jail or prison term should not be imposed.
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify defendant of a right to be represented by counsel at
the sentencing court and prosecuting attorney in the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him
writing (45-deys) in advance in all cases [where] if he is indigent. The order shall also inform the
when termination of [supervision] supervised prob- defendant of arightto present evidence.
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or
ation wilt occur by law. The notification shall
include a probation progress report and complete deny the allegations of the affidavit.4 If the defenrepdrf of details on outstanding Pnes and restitution dant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the
orders.
1(c)-At tiny time prior to the termination of allegations. The persons who have given adverse
probatfoft-, 'Ufton a minimum of five days' notice information on which the allegations are based shall
and' a hearing or upon a waiver of the notice and be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by
hearing- by 'the probationer, the court may extend the defendant unless the court for good cause othprobotion for an additional term of 18 months in erwise orders. The defendant may call witnesses,
felony or dais A misdemeanors or six months in appear and speak in his own behalf, and present
class B misdemeanors if fines or restitution or both evidence.
are owing.]
(e) After the hearing!,] the court shall make fin(8) (a) fAll time served without violation while on dings of fact. Upon a finding that the defendant
probation applies to service of the total term of violated the conditions of probation, the court may
probation but does not eliminate the requirement of order the probation revoked, modified, continued,
serving 18 consecutive months without violation in or that the entire probation term commence anew.
If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sencutive months without violation in class B misdem- tenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be
eanor cases.] Any time served by a probationer executed.
outside of confinement after having been charged
(10) Restitution imposed under this chapter is
with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to considered a debt for "willful and malicious injury"
revoke probation does not constitute service of time for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in
toward the total probation term unless the probati- bankruptcy as provided in Title II, Section 523,
oner is exonerated at a hearing to revoice the prob- U.S.CA. 1985.
ation. Any time served in confinement awaiting a
hearing or decision concerning revocation of probation docs not constitute service of time toward the
total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing.
(b) [When any probationer^ without authority
H. B. No. 322
from the court Or the Department of Corrections,
Passed 2-22-89, Approved 3-13-89
absents himself from the statet or avoids or evades
Ef fective 4-24-89
probation supervision, the period of absence, avoi
Laws of Utah 1989, Chapter 153
dance* or evasion tolls the probation period.] The
Juror and Witness Fees 1989
running of the probation period is tolled upon the
filing of a violation report with the court alleging a
violation of the terms and conditions of probation By R. Lee Ellertson, Stephen M. Bodily, Franklin
C. Prante
or upon the issuance of an OTder to show catise or
warrant by the court.
1(c) Nothing in this section precludes the court An Act relating to judicial procedure; amending provisions regarding juror and witness
from discharging a probationer at any timet at the
discretion of the Court,]
fee procedures; and amending the fee
(9) (a) [Except as provided in Subsection (7) (c)
amounts.
of this chapter4 probation} Probation may not be
modified or extended except upon waiver of a THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:
finding in court that the probationer has violated
the conditions of probation. Probation may not be AMENDS:
revoked except upon a hearing in court and a 17-18-1, as last amended by Chapter 64, Laws of
finding that the conditions of probation have been
Utah 1979
violated.
17-20-1, as last amended by Chapter 152, Laws
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with
of Utah 1988
particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of
17-20-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953
the conditions of probation, the court [which] that 21-5-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953
authorized probation shall determine [whether] if 21-5-4, as last amended by Chapter 152, Laws of
the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe
Utah 1988
that revocation, modification, or extension of pro- 21-5-5. Utah Code Annotated 1953
bation is justified. IT the court determines [that] { 21-5-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953
there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served 21-5-7.5, as enacted by Chapter 152, Laws of
on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy
of the affidavit and an order to show cause'why his

ADDENDUM B

CH. 20

CRIMINAL LAW

mr

CHAPTER 20
S. B. No. 91

(Passed January 28, 19S4. In effect March 29, 1984.)

MISDEMEANORS- -PROBATION REDUCTIONS
By Senators Stratford, Cornaby
AN ACT RELATING TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; OMITTING PROBATION FOR CLASS C MISDEMEANORS; SPECIFYING PROBATION
PROCEDURES IN GENERAL; AND PLACING RESTITUTION OBLIGATIONS OUTSTANDING AT THE END OF PROBATION UNDER
THE COURTS' CIVIL JURISDICTION FOR COLLECTION.
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 77-18-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 85, LAWS OF UTAH 1983.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1.

Section amended.

Section 77-18-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by
Chapter 85, Laws of Utah 1983, is amended to read:
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence--Probation--Period-- Supervision-Presentence investigation--Conditions--Restitution-- Revocation.
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or
offense, except in the case of class C misdemeanors, for which probation
may not be imposed, and if it appears compatible with the public interest,
the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place
the defendant on probation for [sueh] a period of time [as] it
[determines] may determine, unless otherwise provided by law. The legal
custody of all probationers is vested in the court having jurisdiction of the
offender and the chief agent of the adult probation and parole section of
the [state division of corrections] Division of Corrections. [In cases that
do not involve an indeterminate sentence, the period of probation may
exceed the length of time of the maximum sentence that could be imposed.]
(2) (a) The Division of Corrections shall establish presentence investigation and supervision standards for all individuals under its jurisdiction.
These standards shall be based on the type of offense and other criteria.
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»,n£ thedemand for services and the available agency resources, which
^ ^^oTCoTTCCiions d e e m s appropriate to determine what level of
^ \ : cc^^2jIL^g provided,
Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted
_ c <iateJudicial Council and Board of Pardons for review and comment
^ ^ :rTadogtion by the Division of Corrections^
(p)

(7) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Division of Correc„s* 1S not required to supervise the probation or parole of any person
-Girted of a class B or C misdemeanor but may, at the discretion of the
j* .t ^Tnnof^ Corrections, and based upon adopted standards, accept a person
, t, tnperyision w ho is convicted of a class B misdemeanor.
[ (3) ] (4) Prior to imposition of any sentence for an offense for which
—obation may be granted, the court may, with the concurrence of the
c/cndant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasona - x period of time for the purpose of obtaining a pre-sentence report on
:r.c defendant. The report shall be prepared by the [department of adult
f-obattofl and parole] Department of Adult Probation and Parole. The
report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied
H, a recommendation from adult probation and parole regarding the
pigment of restitution by the defendant. The contents of the report shall be
confidential. The court may disclose all or parts of the report to the
ccfendant or his counsel as the interest of justice requires. At the time of
sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or information the defendant
or the prosecuting attorney may wish to present concerning the appropriate
sentence. [Such] This testimony or information shall be presented in open
court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
[B)] (5) After a plea or verdict of guilty, or after a verdict against
the defendant on a plea of a former conviction or acquittal or once in
jeopardy, if the judgment is not arrested or a new trial granted, the court
must appoint a time for pronouncing judgment in accordance with Rule 22,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Whenever possible, in all offenses
involving damage to persons or property, the pre-sentence report of the
defendant shall be made available to the court prior to the pronouncement
of judgment.
[(4)] (6) After a hearing, the court may increase or decrease the
probation period, unless otherwise provided by law, and may revoke or
modify any condition of probation. While on probation, and as a condition
inereof, the defendant may be required to:
(a) [ Pay ] pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of
being placed on probation;
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(b) [Pay] pav amounts required under provisions of Section 77-32a-l
through 77-32a-14;
(c) [Provide] provide for the support of others for whose support he
is legally liable;
(d)

[ Participate ] participate in available rehabilitation programs;

(e) [Serve] serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one
year; or
(f) [Serve] serve a term of home confinement. The court may impose
all or part of the costs of supervision as a condition of home confinement.
(7)
Restitution shall be imposed unless upon a hearing in court a
finding is made that restitution is inappropriate under Subsection 76-3-201
(3) (b) or the defendant objects to its imposition under Subsection 76-3-201
(3) (c).
[(5)] (8) While on probation and as a condition thereof, the defendant
shall be required to make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims
as defined in Subsection 76-3-201 (4) for pecuniary damages as provided in
Section 76-3-201 caused by the offense to which the defendant has pleaded
guilty, no contest, or for which a conviction was had or by any other
criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court, unless
the court in applying the criteria stated in Subsection 76-3-201 (3) finds
that restitution is inappropriate. If the court determines that restitution is
inappropriate, the court shall state for the court record the reasons for the
decision.
[(6)] (9) The prosecutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to
the clerk of the court. The clerk shall place the order on the civil docket
and shall provide notice of the order to the parties. The order shall be
treated as a legal judgment under which the victim may seek civil remedy.
(10) (a) Upon completion without violation of 18 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor
cases, the offender shall be terminated from sentence and the supervision
of the Division of Corrections, unless the person is earlier terminated by
the court.
(b) The Division of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court in
writing of all cases where termination of supervision occurs by law. The
notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report
of details on outstanding fines and restitution orders.
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(11)(a)
AH time served on probation by any person without violation
0
applies^ service of the total term of probation but does not preclude the
r^qmren^nt of serving 18 months without violation in felony or class A
^demeanor cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor cases. Any time
spp^T^^ person outside of confinement after commission of a probation
N Ration does not constitute service of the total term unless the person is
exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. Any "time spent in
refinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation of probau o n does not constitute service of the term of probation except in the case
0 f exoneration at the hearing, in which case the time spent shall be included
m computing the total probation term.
(b) Whenever any probationer, without authority from the Division of
perfections, absents himself from the state, or avoids or evades probation
^^ryjsion, the period of absence, avoidance, or evasion tolls the probation
period.
(c)
Nothing in this section precludes the court from discharging a
probationer at any time, at the discretion of the court.
[£?)] (12) (a) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in
court and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b)
Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court
which authorized probation shall determine whether the affidavit establishes
probable cause to believe that revocation or modification of probation may
be justified. If the court determines that there is probable cause, it shall
cause to be served on the defendant a copy of the affidavit and an order to
show cause why his probation should not be revoked or modified.
(c)
The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing, which shall be within seven days of the service upon the defendant
unless he shows good cause for a continuance, and shall inform the
defendant of a right to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to
have counsel appointed for him if he is indigent. The order shall also
inform the defendant of a right to present evidence as provided in the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations
of the affidavit. If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations, which need
not be evidence admissible in a trial. The persons who have given adverse
information on which the allegations are based shall be presented as
witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the court for good
cause otherwise orders. The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak
in his own behalf, and present evidence.
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(e)
After hearing, the court shall make findings of fact. Upon
determining that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the
court may order the probation revoked, modified, or continued. If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously
imposed shall be executed.
[($)
Restitution shall be imposed unless upon a hearing in court a
finding is made that restitution is inappropriate pursuant to Subsection
76 3 201 (3) (b) or the defendant objects to its imposition pursuant to
Subsection 76 3 201 (3) (c).]
(13) In cases where an 18-month probation term in felony and class A
misdemeanor cases or a six-month term in class B misdemeanor cases has
been completed without violation, but fine or restitution orders are still
outstanding, supervision by the Division of Corrections shall be terminated
pursuant to this section. The court may retain civil jurisdiction for the
purposes of collecting the fines or restitution. In these cases, the court may
order the Department of Social Services to enforce the collection, and the
Office of Recovery Services may withhold the cost of collection from any
recovered fine or restitution.
[&)] (14) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt
for "willful and malicious injury" for purposes of exceptions listed to
discharge in bankruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 523, U.S.C.A.
Approved February 16, 1984.

ADDENDUM C

INCIDENT REPORT

DATE
NAME:

MOYA, Joseph Finano, aka PADILLA

COURT:

April 17, 1985

COURT CASE NO.: CR 84-892

Third Judicial District

JUDGE:

Scott Daniels
Burglary, Fel III 0

DATE RECEIVED ON PROBATION: September 13, 1984

OFFENSE:

ADDRESS:

EMPLOYMENT: —

Rio Arriba Co Jail, Espanola, N M

—

COMMENTS:
Reference our incident report of January 9, 1985, and the Pre-Sentence
Report of September 7, 1984.
Defendant was released from the Salt Lake County Jail on October 3,
1984, to the custody of New Mexico authorities. He has remained in their
custody, in Rio Arriba County, and it appears now that the charges in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, will not be continued, due to prosecutorial problems.
This agency does not feel that it would be adviseable to extradite
defendant back to Utah, but we would request that a "Domestic" warrant be
issued to arrest defendant in the event he decides to return to,Utah.. if\

APPROVED

f£c^Mt

DENIED
DATE
COMMENT

IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN BY AGENT:

RECOMMENDATION:

Obtained data, informed Supervisor and Court.

Request that N C I C, No Bail warrant of January 14, 1985, be

recalled, and that a "Domestic" warrant, with bail of $25,000.00 be issued.

EUGENE F. P R E S S E T T S U P E R V I S O R

/JOHN W. MCNEILL DISTRICT AGENT

NOTEr-This form is used to report rule infractions to the Court.
Original stays in file
Signed copy to Court
Other copies"as needed

APSP/26 11/80

. r\
J)

lemur'

ADDENDUM D ( l )

O C T 3 1 1988
H. Dixon Hindtey. CJferk 3rd JDist. Court
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF

VS

:

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

MOYA, Joseph Finano

:

Court Case No:

Defendant

STATE OF UTAH

CR 84-892

:

)
) • ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
JOHN W. MC NEILL, being duly sworn upon an oath
deposes and says that:

He is a Probation Officer for the Utah State

Department of Corrections; that on the 10th day of August, 1984, the
above-named defendant was adjudged guilty of the crime of Burglary, a
Third Degree Felony in the above-entitled Court and on the 13th day of
September, 1984, was sentenced to serve a term of not to exceed 5 years in
the Utah State Prison; that the execution of the imposed sentence was
stayed and the defendant was placed on probation under the supervision of
the Department of Corrections; that the above-entitled defendant did
violate the terms and conditions of the defendant's probation as follows,
to-wit:

1.

That the defendant has failed to report to The Department of
Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, for forty (40) months, those
being April 1985, through August 1988, inclusive in violation of the
Courts orders per Judgement dated on the 13th of September 1984.

-2-

2.

That the defendant has failed to make any payments ordered
per Judgement of 13th of September, 1984.

by the Court

5.

That the defendant failed to report to the Department of Corrections,
Adult Probation and Parole, to execute a Probation Agreement in
violation of the Court's order per Judgement order of the 13th of
September, 1984.

i.

That the defendant committed the offense of Theft by receiving of about
6:00 a.m. on or about the 26th of September 1988, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, in that the defendant did, as a party to the offense,
receive, retain, conceal , or withhold the property of Advanced Weather
Proofing, to-wit: one typewriter, and blank checks, knowing they were
stolen, and/or believing they probably had been stolen, with the purpose
to deprive the owner thereof, in violation of the Courtfs order of
probation executed by the Court per Judgement Order of the 13th of
September, 1984.
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that an Order of the Court issue

lirecting and requiring the above-named defendant to be and appear before
;aid Court to show cause, if any, he has, why the aforesaid period of
>robation should not be revoked, and why said defendant should not be
"orthwith committed to the Utah State Prison.

JOHN W. MC NEILL, PROBATION OFFICER
iubscribed and sworn to before me this 3^dl

day of

&C$&1--VJL^S

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing: Salt Lake City, Utah
Commission expires:
:s.—C/~fh

> 1988.
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1988

3rd DJSt. Court
H. Dix0h Hindley, C>ark 3r
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

^AMENDED

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

VS
MOYA, J o s e p h

Court

Finano

Case No:

CR84-892

Defendant

STATE OF UTAH

)
): ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
JOHN W. MC NEILL, being duly sworn upon an oath
deposes and says that:

He is a Probation Officer for the Utah State

Department of Corrections; that on the 10th day of August, 1984, the
above-named defendant was adjudged guilty of the crime of Burglary, a
Third Degree Felony in the above-entitled Court and on the 13th day of
September, 1984, was sentenced to serve a term of not to exceed 5 years in
the Utah State Prison; that the execution of the imposed sentence was
stayed and the defendant was placed on probation under the supervision of
the Department of Corrections; that the above-entitled defendant did
violate the terms and conditions of the defendant's probation as

follows,

to-wi t:

1.

That the defendant has failed to report to The Department of
Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, for forty (40) months, those
being April 1985, through August 1988, inclusive in violation of the
Courts orders per Judgement dated on the 13th of September 1984.

OGUGJ£
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l.

That the defendant has failed to make any payments ordered
per Judgement of 13th of September, 1984.

5.

That the defendant failed to report to the Department of Corrections,
Adult Probation and Parole, to execute a Probation Agreement
in
violation of the Court's order per Judgement order of the 13th of
September, 1984,

4.

That the defendant committed the offense of Forgery, a Third Degree
Felony, on or about the 8th of August 1985, in Espanola, New Mexico, in
that the defendant did, as a party to the offense, attempt to cash a
check which he knew, or should have known, was stolen, to which offense
the defendant entered a plea of guilty on the 5th day of November, 1985,
said offense being in violation of the Court's order of probation
executed by the Court per Judgement Order of the 13th of September, 1984.

5.

That the defendant committed the offense of Burglary, a Third Degree
Felony, on or about the 2nd day of July, 1988, at about 76 South 900
West, Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, Utah, in that the defendant
did enter or remain in the premises of the 76 Club, at the aforesaid
address, with the intent to commit a Theft, said offense being in
violation of the Court's order of probation executed by the Court per
Judgement Order of 13th day of September 1984.

WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that an Order of the Court
directing and requiring the above-named defendant

by the Court

issue

to be and appear before

said Court to show cause, if any, he has, why the aforesaid period of
probation should not be revoked, and why said defendant should not be
forthwith committed

to the Utah State Prison.

^JOHN

W. MC NEILL, PROBATION OFFICER

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of October, 1988.

NOTARY PUBLIC
\
Residing: Salt Lake City, Utah
Commission expires: 02-04-90

